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Warner Norcross + Judd LLP is a corporate law firm with over 230 attorneys serving clients in nine offices throughout Michigan. Among the largest law firms in Michigan, Warner works in virtually all areas of business law.

Michigan Law Firm - Warner Norcross + Judd LLP

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently upheld the constitutionality of three Michigan laws that impose costs on criminal defendants. In the consolidated cases of People v. Shenoskey, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170608_c332735_25_332735.opn.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">No. 332735</a>, and People v. Crawford, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170608_c332735_25_332735.opn.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">No. 333375</a>, the court examined the constitutionality of three statutes imposing costs on criminal defendants. MCL 769.1j(1)(a) allows a sentencing court to order a criminal defendant to pay $68.00 if the defendant is convicted of a felony.  MCL 771.3c(1) requires that, for each order of probation for a defendant, the department of corrections shall collect a supervision fee of not more than $135,00 per month for each month of probation, not to exceed 60 months. MCL 600.4803(1) imposes a 20% penalty for failure of a defendant to pay a penalty, fee, or cost within 56 days of the due date.  The defendants did not properly preserve their issues for appeal, so the court reviewed for plain error.  The court held that all three statutes were constitutional.

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In Shenoskey, the defendant pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months to five years in prison. The trial court imposed a crime victims’ rights assessment, court costs, attorney fees, and other unspecified costs, which made the defendant subject to MCL 769.1j(1)(a). That statute provides that, if a court orders a convicted defendant to pay any combination of a fine, costs, or applicable assessments, then the court must order that the person pay not less than $68.00 if convicted of a felony. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $68.00 in costs. The defendant appealed that order and argued that the trial court’s imposition of the $68.00 cost was an unconstitutional tax that violated the separation of powers.

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The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s order. In its reasoning, the court cited its recent decision in People v. Cameron, which considered the same argument regarding a closely related statute, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). While the appeals court agreed that the costs were a tax, the court noted that the statute did not violate the separation of powers because, as Cameron noted, the Michigan Constitution does not require an absolute separation of powers. In addition, the appeals court rejected the argument that MCL 769.1j(1)(a) violates the requirement of the Michigan Constitution that every law imposing a tax shall distinctively state the tax by extending the reasoning in Cameron that the statute gives guidance and limits the costs to those reasonably related to the costs that the court incurs.

In Crawford, the defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver marijuana and was sentenced to two years of probation by the trial court. Per MCL 771.3c(1), the trial court imposed probation oversight fees of $240.00, or $10.00 a month. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to consider his income at the time the probation supervision fees were imposed.

The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendant’s argument and held that the trial court’s imposition of a probation oversight fee of $240.00, or $10.00 per month, was perfectly permissible. MCL 771.3c(1) provides that a court must include a probation supervision fee in each convicted defendant’s probation order of not more than $135.00, multiplied by the number of months of probation ordered (but not more than sixty months). In determining these fees, a court must consider projected income and financial resources and must use the table of projected monthly income, provided in the law, to determine the amount of probation oversight fees to be ordered. However, the law provides that a court may order a higher amount than that given by the table, as long as the costs do not exceed the maximum of $135.00 a month for a maximum of sixty months of probation. If a court orders a higher amount, the amount and reasons for ordering that amount must be stated in the court order. Accordingly, the appeals court reasoned that, because the statute does not require a court to consider a defendant’s current income, but instead requires a court to consider his or her projected income, the trial court’s imposition of the probation oversight fee was valid. Additionally, the appeals court noted that the trial court’s imposition of the fee corresponded to a monthly projected income of at least $250.00. And, as a part of the defendant’s probation, he was required to obtain employment and work at least thirty hours per week. Thus, even if the defendant made minimum wage, the defendant’s projected income would be over $250.00 a month, justifying the $10.00 a month fee.

On appeal, the defendant also argued that requiring a defendant to pay a 20% penalty for failure to pay a penalty, fee, or cost within fifty-six days pursuant to MCL 600.4803 is unconstitutional. The defendant argued that the 20% rate was usurious. However, the appeals court rejected this argument, holding that the 20% rate is a penalty—not accumulated interest. Further, the court noted that, even if the court were to accept an interest classification, usury limits are set by the legislature, and the legislature set this 20% penalty. Because an interest rate set by the legislature cannot, by definition, be deemed usurious, the appeals court concluded that the defendant’s argument was nonsensical. Next, the defendant argued that the 20% penalty is imposed against convicted defendants for no reason other than an inability to pay and, therefore, it violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has indeed mandated that a defendant cannot be subject to a greater penalty merely because of an inability to pay a fine or cost imposed by a court. But the Court of Appeals resolved this concern by noting that MCL 600.4803(1) grants the trial court authority to waive the penalty. Thus, because there is a mechanism in place to excuse the imposition of the 20% penalty for a defendant who is unable to pay a fine, fee, or cost through no fault of their own, there was no due process violation. Additionally, the appeals court held that MCL 600.4803(1) raises no equal protection concern because all persons who fail to pay a court ordered fine, fee, or cost within fifty-six days are subject to the 20% penalty.

Thus, in both cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that neither defendant demonstrated that the trial courts committed plain error in any of the issues presented on appeal, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courts’ orders.

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Madelaine C. Lane

Labor and Employment

Pay-up: Constitutional to require criminal defendants to pay costs

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Pay-up: Constitutional to require criminal defendants to pay costs

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