In People v. Corbin, No. 319122, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s restitution award which had ordered the defendant to pay restitution to two victims because (1) defendant was only convicted for illegal acts involving one of the victims, and (2) the evidence provided no reasonable factual basis for awarding the amount it did as to the other brother. In vacating the restitution awards, the Court of Appeals found that the plain language of MCL 780.766(2) provides that convicted defendants must make full restitution to “any victim of defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction.”
The defendant was charged with sexually abusing two young brothers, referred pseudonymously as Shane and Austin. The defendant pled guilty to the charged conduct involving Shane, but the charge involving Austin was dismissed. The defendant nevertheless admitted to having engaged in criminal sexual conduct with Austin. The trial court sentenced the defendant to prison and ordered him to pay restitution to both victims for future therapy costs, future medication expenses, future psychiatric services, and lost wages.
In vacating the restitution awards, the Court of Appeals found that the plain language of MCL 780.766(2) provides that convicted defendants must make full restitution to “any victim of defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction.” The court held that because the defendant was not convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving Austin, the trial court lacked authority to award restitution to Austin for defendant’s uncharged conduct. As to the restitution awarded Shane, the Court of Appeals found that the standard to be applied when calculating a restitution amount is one of reasonableness. It went on to say that future losses (including the cost of future medical and psychological care) are subject to restitution if such losses are “reasonably expected to be incurred.” The court found that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on testimony that provided estimates of general costs of treatment for an average sexual abuse victim. Moreover, the restitution was not predicated on the “direct” harm that Shane sustained as a result of the defendant’s offense.
