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Warner Norcross + Judd LLP is a corporate law firm with over 230 attorneys serving clients in nine offices throughout Michigan. Among the largest law firms in Michigan, Warner works in virtually all areas of business law.

Michigan Law Firm - Warner Norcross + Judd LLP

In <em><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov:81/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20150528_C317863_39_317863.OPN.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">People v. Hallak</a></em>, No. 317863, the Court of Appeals held that lifetime electronic monitoring of a defendant convicted of CSC II does not violate a defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and unreasonable searches.  Further, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err by engaging in judicial fact-finding when scoring the sentencing guidelines.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence.

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The defendant, a physician, was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct stemming from the inappropriate touching of a twelve-year-old patient. The trial court sentenced defendant to 57 to 180 months for the CSC II conviction and ordered lifetime electronic monitoring. On appeal, defendant argued that lifetime electronic monitoring for persons convicted of CSC II, which is required by MCL 750.520c(2)(b) and 750.520n(l), constituted unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment, violated the Fourth amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches, and violated state and federal Double Jeopardy Clauses. Additionally, defendant sought to overturn his sentence by arguing that his due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence of intent, i.e., that he touched the victim with a sexual purpose. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

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The court upheld the lifetime electronic monitoring of Defendant for a conviction of CSC II against a victim 13-years-old or less.&nbsp; The court reasoned that although electronic monitoring is a punishment, in light of other states’ penalties for similar crimes, the goals of rehabilitation, the gravity of the offense weighed against the severity of the sentence, and evidence of defendant’s improper sexual acts in this case involving 13 women or children, lifetime monitoring is not cruel and unusual punishment.&nbsp; Further, defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument failed because the public interest served by monitoring those convicted of CSC II outweighed Defendant’s reduced privacy.&nbsp; Finally, lifetime electronic monitoring does not violate the state and federal Double Jeopardy Clauses because the legislature intended that both defendant’s prison sentence and the requirement of lifetime monitoring be sanctions for the subject crime. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence.

The Court of Appeals also held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant because, under MCL 750.520h, the jury may convict based on the uncorroborated evidence of a CSC victim and minimal circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s state of mind. Moreover, the court noted that precedent precluded defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding.

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Madelaine C. Lane

Labor and Employment

COA: Lifetime electronic monitoring of defendant convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct is constitutional

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COA: Lifetime electronic monitoring of defendant convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct is constitutional

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