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Warner Norcross + Judd LLP is a corporate law firm with over 230 attorneys serving clients in nine offices throughout Michigan. Among the largest law firms in Michigan, Warner works in virtually all areas of business law.

Michigan Law Firm - Warner Norcross + Judd LLP

In <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov:81/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20150915_C320353_39_320353.OPN.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">People v. Humphrey</a>, No. 320353, the Court of Appeals held that the statutory definition of “firearm”, as used in MCL 750.227(2), does not require that the weapon be operable based on the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636 (2006).

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The defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) under MCL 750.227(2) after a police officer frisked the defendant, discovering a handgun concealed under the defendant’s pants. While the officer did not inspect the weapon at the scene, a subsequent ballistics test found that the handgun was inoperable due to a missing firing pin. The defendant argued that the handgun discovered on his person did not constitute a “firearm” as defined in M.C.L. 750.227(2) because the missing firing pin made the weapon inoperable. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the CCW charge, reasoning that the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of “firearm” in Peals only applied to felon-in-possession and felony-firearm charges and not to CCW charges.

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In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals held that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Peals unquestionably controlled the outcome of this case because its interpretation of firearm was not offense specific. While, the Court of Appeals held in People v. Gardner, 194 Mich. App. 652 (1992), that a weapon’s inoperability was an affirmative defense to a CCW charge, the court declared that Peals overruled Gardner. It reasoned that, while Peals addressed only felon-in-possession and felony-firearm charges, Peals made clear that a weapon is a firearm as defined statutorily based on the “design and construction of the weapon, rather than its state of operability.” As a result, Peals mandates that the operability of a firearm is not relevant to a firearms offense, including a CCW charge. Finally, while the court noted that the statutory definition in effect at the time of the defendant’s offense differs from that currently in effect, its decision would be the same under the current definition of firearm.

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COA: Definition of “firearm” does not require weapon to be operable for purposes of MCL 750.227(2)

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COA: Definition of “firearm” does not require weapon to be operable for purposes of MCL 750.227(2)

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